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NOTES
LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION CLEANUP
AND THE WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
ACT OF 1970
Recent events, particularly the wreck of the Torrey Canyon and
the Santa Barbara drilling disaster, have focused attention on the
problems of oil pollution of the sea and adjacent shorelines. The
Water Quality Improvement Act of 19701 represents the congressional
response to these problems. Although the Act is a major improvement
over existing law, particularly with regard to conditions and limita-
tions of liability for cleanup costs2 and prevention of pollution fol-
lowing a discharge of oil,3 its provisions should be extended further.
I
POLLUTION BY VESSELS
A. Liability for Violations
The first statute dealing specifically with oil pollution was the
Oil Pollution Act of 1924,4 which outlawed discharges of oil upon the
navigable waters of the United States. 5 The 1966 amendments to this
Act extended its coverage6 but also rendered it almost impossible to
enforce by defining "discharge" as a grossly negligent or willful act.7
1 Pub. L. No. 91-224 (April 3, 1970). The Act also deals with control of hazardous
polluting substances, control of sewage from vessels, mine pollution control demonstra-
tions, Great Lakes pollution control, and cooperation by all federal agencies in pollution
control.
2 See text at notes 42-57 and 65-71 infra.
3 See text at notes 40-41, 51-53, and 66-68 infra.
4 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604, as amended, Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-753, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1252 (repealed 1970). This is the only act repealed by the
1970 Act.
G Exceptions were made for situations of emergency imperilling life or property,
unavoidable accident, collision or stranding, and discharges permitted under regulations
issued by the Secretary of the Interior. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, § 3, 43 Stat. 605
(repealed 1970).
6 The amendments extended the Act to cover discharges upon shorelines (Act of Nov.
3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1253 (repealed 1970)), and discharges upon
or into internal as well as coastal navigable waters. Id.
7 Id. An official of the Justice Department testified that none of the agencies that
refer oil pollution violations to the Justice Department had been able to provide evi-
dence of gross negligence or willfulness. Water Pollution-1967, Hearings on S. 1591 and
S. 1604 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public
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The effect of this amendment was to compel enforcement agencies to
utilize the Refuse Act of 1899,8 which prohibits the dumping of refuse
into navigable waters of the United States.9 Recently held applicable to
discharges of oil,10 this statute provides as a maximum penalty for
violation a fine of.$2,500 and imprisonment for one year.11 Although
these provisions are identical to those of the amended 1924 Oil Pol-
lution Act,12 the latter also provided for a $10,000 fine on any vessel
from which oil was discharged.1 Moreover, this fine constituted a
maritime lien on the vessel, and clearance from any American port
could be withheld until the fine was paid.14 These remedies are not
available under the Refuse Act.
Congress implemented the 1954 International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil15 by enacting the Oil
Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 248 (1967). These agencies include the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, the Corps of Engineers, and the Coast Guard.
Id. at 238.
8 Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 33
U.S.C.).
9 3 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
10 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
11 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
12 The amended 1924 Act provided for a fine of up to $2,500 and/or imprisonment
not to exceed one year as punishment for violations. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, § 4, 43
Stat. 605, as amended, Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1253
(repealed 1970).
13 Id.
14 Id. The amended 1924 Act also provided that United States officials could arrest
offenders who committed violations within their presence with or without a warrant. Id.,
80 Stat. at 1254.
15 May 29, 1961, [19611 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3. The Con-
vention establishes certain zones (annex A) in which discharges of oil or of oily mixtures
(at least 100 parts oil per 1,000,000 parts mixture) by tankers are prohibited. Article III.
(Ships other than tankers are required to make any discharges as far from land as pos-
sible. Three years after adoption of the Convention, such ships are to be subject to the
same provisions as govern tankers.) Exceptions are provided for discharges made for the
purpose of securing the safety of the ship, preventing damage to the ship or cargo, or
saving life at sea; a further exception is made for discharges resulting from damage to
the ship or unavoidable leakage, provided all reasonable precautions have been taken
after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the leakage to prevent or minimize
the discharge. Article IV. Enforcement of these provisions is to be conducted by the
contracting flag state, and penalties for violations outside the territorial waters of
the state in question are required to be at least as strict as those for violations within
such territorial waters. Article VI. Moreover, each contracting government is under
an obligation to conduct an investigation of any ship registered in that country
if another contracting government furnishes particulars of a violation. If such an
investigation produces sufficient evidence to prove the violation, the flag state is required
to institute proceedings against the owner or master of the ship in question. Article X.
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Pollution Act of 1961.16 Amended in 196617 to conform to the 1962
amendments to the 1954 Convention,' the Act prohibits the discharge
of oil or oily mixtures 9 by ships of American registry within fifty
miles of land unless otherwise provided by the Convention.20 Like the
1899 Refuse Act,21 the statute makes illegal discharges punishable by a
fine of not more than $2,500 and imprisonment of up to one year.22
The 1961 Act is more extensive than either the Refuse Act or the
1924 Act, however, in that it authorizes regulations for installation of
equipment23 and requires maintenance of an oil record book.24 Viola-
Ships are required to install oily ballast water separators (article VII), and facilities for
reception of such water are to be constructed in each main port of each contracting
state. Article VIII. Finally, each ship is required to carry an oil record book, which is to
be available for inspection by any contracting government when the ship is in port in
that country and which is to be admissible in any judicial proceeding. Article IX.
For a treatment of international approaches to the problem of oil pollution, see
Note, Continental Shelf Oil Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution Control, 55
ComRjaL L. RPv. 113 (1969).
16 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964).
17 80 Stat. 372 (1966).
18 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1962,
Sept. 9, 1966, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332. The amendments
expand the coverage of the convention from tankers of over 500 gross registered tons to
those over 150 gross registered tons (article II); allow discharge of residue resulting from
purification or clarification of fuel oil or lubricating oil, provided that such discharge is
made as far from land as is practicable (article IV); provide that penalties, in addition
to being at least as severe as those imposed within territorial waters, shall be of adequate
severity to discourage any unlawful discharge (article VI); eliminate the oily ballast water
separator requirement in favor of a provision that water may be discharged into bilges
only if effective means are provided to ensure that oil in bilges is not discharged (article
VII); list specific required entries for the oil record book (article IX); and redefine the
zones in which discharges are prohibited. Annex A. See note 20 infra.
19 33 US.C. § 1001(e) (1964) (at least 100 parts oil per 1,000,000 parts mixture).
20 Id. § 1011. For the exceptions to the 50-mile rule, see maps in Water Pollution-
1967, supra note 7, pt. 1, at 199-202.
The statute incorporates the Convention's exceptions as to tonnage of ships (33 U.S.C.
§ 1001(i) (1964); note 18 supra), discharges from purification or clarification of fuel or
lubricating oil, and emergency situations. Id. § 1003; notes 15 & 18 supra.
21 Text at note 11 supra.
22 33 U.S.C. § 1005 (1964).
23 Id. § 1007(b).
24 Operations bearing on possible pollution sources are to be recorded, and the book
is to be available for inspection. The particular operations to be recorded are: (1) ballast-
ing of and discharge of ballast from cargo tanks of tankers; (2) cleaning of cargo tanks
of tankers; (3) settling in slop tanks and discharge of water from tankers; (4) disposal from
tankers of oily residues from slop tanks or other sources; (5) ballasting, or cleaning during
voyage, of bunker fuel tanks of ships other than tankers; (6) disposal of oily residues from
ships other than tankers; and (7) accidental or other exceptional discharges or escapes of
oil from tankers or other ships. In addition, any prohibited discharge or a discharge for a
purpose such as saving life is to be recorded. Id. §§ 1008, 1012.
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tions of these regulations are also punishable by fine and imprison-
ment.25
The 1970 Act prohibits the discharge26 by vessels27 of oil2s into or
upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines,
or the waters of the contiguous zone,29 except where permitted either
by presidential regulation" or by the 1954 Convention. 31 Although the
Act does not provide imprisonment for illegal discharges, a knowing dis-
charge is punishable by a civil penalty 2 of not more than $10,000,
assessed by the Secretary of Transportation.33 This penalty may not be
25 The penalty for failure to install proper equipment is a fine of $100 (id. § 1007);
failure to keep an oil record book is punishable by a fine of between $500 and $1,000
(id. § 1008(b)); and the penalty for a knowing entry of a false or misleading item in
the record book is a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $1,000 and/or imprison-
ment for up to six months. Id.
26 "'Discharge' includes, but is not limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, or dumping .... " Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-224, § ll(a)(2) (April 3, 1970). The discharge must be in harmful quantities, as
determined by the President. Id. § 11(b)(2).
27 A vessel is defined as "every description of watercraft or other artificial contriv-
ance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water .... ." Id.
§ 11(a)(3). Excluded from this definition are public vessels-vessels "owned or bare-
boat chartered and operated by the United States, or by a State or political subdivision
thereof, or by a foreign nation, except when such vessel is engaged in commerce .
Id. § 11(a)(4).
28 Oil is defined as "oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to,
petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged
spoil .... " Id. § ll(a)(1).
29 The contiguous zone is defined by reference to article 24 of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, March 24, 1961, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
30 The regulations issued by the President must "be consistent with maritime safety
and with marine and navigation laws and regulations and applicable water quality
standards." Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(b)(2)
(April 3, 1970).
31 Id. For the exceptions under the 1954 Convention, see notes 15 & 18 supra.
32 Whereas previous statutes imposed fines and imprisonment for illegal discharges
and violations of regulations (notes 4-25 and accompanying text supra; notes 58-62 and ac-
companying text infra), the 1970 Act uses these sanctions only in the event of failure to
notify the government of a discharge. Notes 40-41 and accompanying text infra. All other
violations are punishable by civil penalties. These penalties differ from criminal sanctions
in the method of assessment and possibility for compromise. Notes 33-36, 38-39, and ac-
companying text infra. For example, one factor in compromise of the penalty for viola-
tion of a presidential regulation is the good faith effort at compliance made by the
owner or operator following notice of a violation. Note 39 infra. In addition, imposition
of a civil penalty does not subject the offender to the stigma that accompanies criminal
sanctions. The use of civil penalties thus reflects a statutory emphasis on preventing or
mitigating pollution following a discharge rather than punishing the offender.
33 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(b)(5) (April 3,
1970). The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to withhold clearance for any vessel
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assessed until the owner or operator 34 charged has had a hearing 5
and may be compromised by the Secretary.86
In addition to prescribing the regulations pertaining to prohibited
discharges, the President is authorized to promulgate regulations estab-
lishing methods for removal of oil, requiring equipment for the
prevention of discharges, and governing inspection procedures.37 Vio-
lation of any of these regulations is punishable by a civil penalty not
to exceed $5,000, assessed by the President.38 As with the penalty for
prohibited discharges, a hearing must be held prior to assessment, and
the penalty may be compromised. 9
Finally, the 1970 Act requires any person in charge of a vessel
from which oil is illegally discharged to notify the appropriate gov-
ernmental agency as soon as he learns of the discharge.40 Failure to
comply is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and one year's impris-
onment,41 the most severe sanction authorized by the Act.
B. Liability for Cleanup Costs
Under the Limited Liability Act of 1851,42 the owner or char-
terer of a vessel, in the absence of privity or knowledge, could limit
his liability to the value of his interest in the vessel and pending
freight.43 This limitation was severely restricted by the ruling that
whose owner or operator is liable to the government for the penalty. Id. This is a
stronger provision than that in the amended 1924 Act, which authorized clearance to be
withheld only from the offending vessel. See text at note 14 supra. The 1970 Act is also
strengthened by authorizing officials to board and inspect vessels, as well as to arrest with-
out warrant offenders who commit a violation in their presence. Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(m) (April 3, 1970). For a corresponding pro-
vision in the amended 1924 Act, see note 14 supra.
34 An owner or operator, in the case of a vessel, means "any person owning, op-
erating, or chartering by demise, such vessel." Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, § il(a)(6) (April 3, 1970).
35 Id. § l1(b)(5).
36 Id. For the purposes of a compromise, the Secretary may consider the following
factors: the size of the owner's or operator's business, the effect of the penalty on the
owner's or operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the violation Id.
37 Id. § ll(j)(l).
38 Id. § 110)(2).
39 Id. The relevant factors affecting a presidential compromise are the gravity of the
violation and the demonstrated good faith of the offender to comply following notification
of a violation. Id.
40 Id. § 1l(b)(4).
41 Id.
42 REv. STAT. §§ 4282-89 (1875), 46 U.S.C. §§ 182-89 (1964).
43 Id. § 4283, 46 U.S.C. at § 18a.
Following the Morro Castle disaster of 1934 (Morro Castle, 17 A.M.C. 895 (S.D.N.Y.
1939)), the Act was amended to provide that an owner would be liable up to $60 per
ton of the vessel's gross tonnage for loss of life or personal injury. Act of Aug. 29, 1935,
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the vessel and pending freight were to be valued after the accident
had occurred. 44 The limitation extended to owners of foreign vessels
who were sued in the United States,45 and following the Torrey Can-
yon disaster the owners of that vessel were permitted to file a petition
to limit their liability to fifty dollars, the value of the one surviving
lifeboat.46
The first change in this limitation was made in 1966 when the
Oil Pollution Act of 192447 was amended to require that any person
discharging oil upon navigable waters remove it immediately.48 If
the oil was not removed, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized
to arrange for its removal; the person responsible for the discharge
was to be liable for costs reasonably incurred in such removal 49 but
only if the discharge was willful or grossly negligent.50
Under the 1970 Act, whenever oil is discharged into or upon the
ch. 804, § 1, 49 Stat. 960, amending 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964). This amendment did not
affect liability for property damage.
44 The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881). Lia-
bility was formerly even more restricted by the locality test announced in The Plymouth,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865), but this case was overruled in 1948 by passage of the Ad-
miralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
45 Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718 (1914); La Bourgogne, 210 US. 95
(1908).
46 In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 409
F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1969). Both the Barracuda Tanker Corporation, which owned the
Torrey Canyon, and the Union Oil Company, which had chartered the vessel for 20 years,
sought to limit their liability and filed petitions in the Southern District of New York to
do so. On September 22, 1967, an ex porte order was entered enjoining the prosecution
of all independent actions in the United States and approving the interim stipulation for
the value of Barracuda's and Union's interest at $50. Having filed claims against Union
alone, the governments of Britain, France, and the States of Guernsey on November 18,
1967, moved to reappraise the value of Union's interest and to modify the ex parte
order insofar as it enjoined independent actions against Union, on the ground that Union
was neither an owner nor a charterer within the meaning of the Limited Liability Act.
The district court, finding that Union was not a charterer within the meaning of the
Act, held that Union could be liable only if it were determined to be an owner, and
that any action against Union had to await the trial of the limitation of liability. 281
F. Supp. at 236. The claimants appealed this ruling, arguing that liability could be
"predicated upon Union's 'status as author and architect of the schemes and entities,
including Barracuda, which were designed to further the ultimate business purposes of
Union.'" 409 F.2d at 1015. The court of appeals held that the claimants could proceed
upon this theory prior to the trial concerning limitation of liability, and modified the
injunction to permit the claimants to assert claims against Union unrelated to the
navigation of the Torrey Canyon. Id.
47 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604, as amended, Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-753, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1252 (repealed 1970). See text at notes 4-14 supra.
48 Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1253 (repealed 1970).
49 Id.
50 Id., 80 Stat. at 1252. The effect of this provision was to render enforcement nearly
impssible. See note 7 supra.
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navigable waters or shorelines of the United States or into the waters
of the contiguous zone, the President is authorized to have the oil re-
moved unless he determines that removal will be properly undertaken
by the owner or operator of the vessel in question.51 This action is
not limited to cleaning up after a discharge; whenever an actual or
potential discharge poses a substantial threat of a pollution hazard,5 2
the United States is authorized to coordinate all efforts to eliminate
the threat and, if necessary, to remove or destroy the vessel causing the
threat.53
In the event of a discharge caused by willful negligence or willful
misconduct within the privity or knowledge of the owner or operator
of a vessel, the government may recover the entire cost of cleanup from
the owner or operator. 54 If the discharge is not the result of such con-
duct, the government may recover removal costs unless the owner or
operator can prove that the discharge was caused solely by an act of
God, 5 an act of war, negligence on the part of the government, or
any act or omission of a third party.56 Unlike liability for willful dis-
charges, however, this liability is limited to one hundred dollars per
gross ton of the vessel or $14 million, whichever is less.57
51 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(c)(1) (April 3,
1970). This provision covers spills not prohibited under the Act, and thus reflects a con-
cern for the cleanup aspects of oil pollution. The Act also establishes a revolving fund
not to exceed $35 million for the purpose of effecting this removal. Id. § 11(k).
52 Such a threat must be to "the public health or welfare of the United States, in-
cluding, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, and wildlife and the public and private shore-
lines and beaches of the United States . Id. § 11(d).
53 Id.
54 Id. § 11(0f().
55 An act of God is defined as "an act occasioned by an unanticipated grave
natural disaster. Id. § ll(a)(12).
56 Id. § 11(f)(1). The conditions and limits of liability are identical for the third
party causing a discharge except that in the event the third party was not the owner or
operator of a vessel that caused the discharge, his liability is limited to what the liability
would have been for the owner or operator of the vessel from which the oil was dis-
charged. Id. § 11(g). The Act is ambiguous in that it does not specify who shall be liable
if the owner and the operator are not the same person. This ambiguity is also present
with regard to third party liability, willful discharges (text at note 54 supra), and dis-
charges from onshore or offshore facilities. Text at note 69 infra. Where the owner and
operator are separate, it would seem that the government could proceed against either
or both.
57 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(g), (April 3,
1970). As was provided in the 1966 amendments to the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 (Act
of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211(a), 80 Stat. 1253. (repealed 1970)), the 1970 Act
stipulates that these costs shall constitute a maritime lien on the vessel from which oil
was discharged. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(f)(1)
(April 3, 1970). The 1970 Act goes further, however, and requires that any owner of a
vessel over 300 gross tons, including any barge of equivalent size, using United States
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II
POLLUTION FROM ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE FACILITIES
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,58 the Secretary
of the Interior is authorized to administer leasing arrangements for
the shelf and to promulgate rules and regulations for the prevention
of waste and the conservation of natural resources. 59 Violation of any
such rule or regulation is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not
over $2,000 and imprisonment of not more than six months. 60 In
addition, the Secretary may, in the event of a violation of lease terms
or of regulations promulgated under the Act, revoke the lease 6' subject
to judicial review. 62
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 goes beyond the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in two important respects. First,
its provisions apply to all onshore and offshore facilities,6 3 not just
those on or over the continental shelf.64 Second, it imposes liability
for cleanup costs as well as penalties for violations of the Act and
regulations issued under it.65 As with a discharge from a vessel, the
President is authorized to arrange for the removal of any oil discharged
by an onshore or offshore facility, unless he determines that such
ports or navigable waters, shall establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility
equal to $100 per gross ton or $14 million, whichever is less. An owner or operator of
more than one vessel need establish responsibility only for his largest vessel. Financial
responsibility may be established by evidence of insurance, surety bonds, qualification as
a self-insurer, or other acceptable evidence. Id. § 11(p)(1). In any action against such a
vessel, the government may proceed directly against the insurer, who shall have the
benefit of all defenses to which the vessel owner or operator would have been entitled.
Id. § ll(p)(3).
58 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964).
59 Id. § 1334(a).
60 Id. § 1334(a)(2).
61 Id. § 1334(b)(1).
62 Id. §§ 1334(b)(1), 13370).
63 An onshore facility is "any facility (including, but not limited to, motor vehicles
and rolling stock) of any kind located in, on, or under, any land within the United States
other than submerged land ...." Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-224, § 11(a)(10) (April 3, 1970). An offshore facility is "any facility of any kind located
in, on, or under, any of the navigable waters of the United States other than a vessel or
a public vessel ...." Id. § 11(a)(11).
64 The Act covers all discharges by facilities into or upon the navigable waters of
the United States, adjoining shorelines, or waters of the contiguous zone. Id. §§ 1l(b)(5),
(c)(1). (f)(l)-(2).
65 Except where they are dearly not applicable to facilities (as in the case of de-
struction of a vessel or withholding clearance for a vessel), the penalties provided for
the owner or operator of a vessel are also the penalties provided for the owner or
operator of an offending onshore or offshore facility. Text at notes 26-41 supra.
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removal will be properly undertaken by the owner or operator.66 In
addition, when the President determines that there is an imminent
and substantial threat to the public health or welfare67 because of an
actual or potential discharge of oil from a facility, he may require
the United States Attorney in the district in which the threat occurs
to secure whatever relief is necessary to abate such threat.68
In the event of a discharge, the conditions of liability for an
owner or operator of an onshore or offshore facility are the same as
those for the owner or operator of a vessel.69 The limit of liability for
a non-willful discharge, however, is $8 million,7 0 as opposed to the $14
million ceiling for a vessel owner or operator.7 1
III
INADEQUACIES OF THE 1970 Acr
Clearly, the Water Quality Improvement Act's greatest contribu-
tion to the law is its emphasis on cleanup and prevention of pollution
following a discharge of oil. Situations may arise, however, in which
parties other than the owner or operator of a tanker from which oil is
discharged will be forced to pay some cleanup costs. 7 2
The Torrey Canyon was a 60,000 gross registered ton tanker 3 and
66 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(c)(1) (April 3,
1970).
67 The public health or welfare of the United States includes, but is "not limited
to, fish, shellfish, and wildlife and public and private property, shorelines, and beaches
within the United States . I..." d. § 11(e).
68 Id. The district courts are vested with jurisdiction to grant such relief as may be
necessary. Id.
o9 Id. §§ ll()(2)-(3). See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra. Third party
liability is limited to what the liability would have been for the owner or operator of
the facility from which the oil was discharged. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(g) (April 3, 1970).
70 Id. §§ I(f)(2)-(3).
71 Text at note 57 supra. In contrast to the provisions concerning vessels, there is
no requirement that owners or operators of facilities establish evidence of financial re-
sponsibility. This defect in the Act could lead to the formation of corporations with
minimal assets, effectively putting a low limit on the owner's or operator's liability. It
should therefore be remedied, either through provisions in the relevant leases, or by an
amendment to the Act.
72 It is unclear whether the 1970 Act's liability limits are sufficient to cover spills-of
fuel from vessels other than tankers. However, the relatively small amounts of oil carried
as fuel by such vessels (compared to that carried as cargo by tankers) and their ratio of
gross tonnage to amount of fuel indicate that the $100 per gross ton or $14 million limit
would be sufficient to cover cleanup costs.
73 Water Pollution-1969, Hearings on S. 7 and S. 544 Before the Subcomm. on Air
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was carrying some 118,000 tons of oil, half of which was estimated to
have been released when the vessel broke up.7 4 Although the tanker's
owners settled with the British and French governments for $7.2
million to cover cleanup costs, 75 the actual costs were over $16 million.76
Since the 1970 Act's liability limit for the Torrey Canyon would have
been $6 million, 77 $10 million in costs would have fallen on someone
other than the owner or operator of the vessel. Indeed, liability
limited to $100 per gross registered ton will rarely, if ever, be sufficient
to cover cleanup costs. 78 The $14 million ceiling, on the other hand,
effectively limits cleanup cost liability to 52,000 tons of oil.7 9 Six
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
91-2, App., at 1544 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
74 N.Y. Times, March 28, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
75 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1389; Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution-
Domestic and International Law, 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1969).
76 Britain originally sought $8,156,400, while France hoped to recover $8 million.
E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DIsAsrER 195, 200 (1968). This figure is
supported by testimony given by Richard A. Frank, Acting Deputy Legal Advisor of the
State Department, in 1969 Hearings, App., at 1544 and by a statement by the Department
of the Interior, in Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments-1969, Hearings on
HR. 4148 and Related Bills Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 316 (1969).
77 At $100 per gross ton, a 60,000 gross ton tanker has a liability limit of $6 million.
The $14 million limitation thus would not apply. Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(f)(1) (April 3, 1970).
78 Using the Torrey Canyon figures (59,000 tons of oil cleaned up at a cost of $16
million), it costs about $270 to clean up one ton of oil. Since the ratio of deadweight
tonnage (cargo capacity) to gross tonnage on the Torrey Canyon was about two to one
(Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 87 FoRDHcM L. Rav. 155, 157-58 (1968)), the cleanup
costs were approximately $540 per gross ton.
The $100 per gross ton limit is inadequate even if one assumes, as did the American
Petroleum Institute (1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1318), the cost of cleanup following the
Torrey Canyon wreck to be $7.2 million. Using that figure, the costs come to $244 per
gross ton.
A study conducted by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration also
indicates the insufficiency of the $100 per gross ton figure. It was found that cleanup
costs range from under $1.00 to over $5.00 per gallon of oil. There may be from 240 to
300 gallons of oil in one ton, depending upon specific gravity and temperature. Finally,
the ratio of carrying capacity to gross tonnage varies from 2.7:1 to 1.5:1. Using figures of
$1.00 per gallon, 250 gallons per ton, and a ratio of 1.8:1, cleanup cost was calculated to
be $450 per gross ton. 1969 Hearings, pt. 1, at 133-34.
Although gross tonnage has traditionally been used to calculate liability, it is more
meaningful to speak in terms of deadweight tonnage. The latter is the cargo carrying
capacity of the vessel, and the ratio between the two varies from vessel to vessel. Thus,
although a liability figure based on gross tonnage could accurately reflect cleanup costs of
the oil carried on one vessel, it might be very inaccurate when applied to another
vessel. The amount of oil, not the vessel's gross tonnage, determines the cleanup costs.
See Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 10-11 & n.34.
79 At $270 a ton, $14 million would clean up 51,851 tons.
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tankers capable of discharging more than that amount of oil already
exist.80 Two of these, the Universe Island and the Universe Kuwait,
could each spill over 300,000 tons of oil;81 the cleanup costs following
such a discharge could be approximately $80 million.82 Moreover,
even larger tankers are planned, some as large as 500,000 deadweight
tons.
83
The liability provided for the owner or operator of an onshore or
offshore facility may also be insufficient to cover all cleanup costs.
Although the costs of cleanup at Santa Barbara, about $3.4 million,8 4
are within the $8 million limit, the recent spillage in the Gulf of Mex-
ico indicates that little can be done to prevent pollution when control
over an offshore well is lost.85 Whether the Gulf cleanup costs exceed
$8 million or not, it is clear that the technological skills for controlling
such a spill are inadequate, 8 and that a spill in which costs exceed the
limit could occur. The problem then, with regard to both tankers
and facilities, is allocating expenses in excess of the limits for owner or
operator liability set by the 1970 Act. Such expenses could be imposed
upon the private person who is injured, the government, the owner
or operator, or another party.
80 These tankers are the E. Maersk (100,600 D.W.T.), the Iyoharu Maru (103,006
D.W.T.), the Bergebig (149,500 D.W.T.), the Esso Scotia (250,000 D.W.T.), and the Uni-
verse Island and the Universe Kuwait (312,000 D.W.T. each). Mendelsohn, supra note 75,
at 10-11 & n.34. For more detailed information on future tankers, see E. CoWAN, supra
note 76, at 224-25.
81 Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 10-11 & n.34.
82 The $14 million ceiling is inadequate even if one assumes that the Torrey
Canyon cleanup costs were $7.2 million. Using that figure, cleanup costs were about $122
per ton of oil; thus a discharge of 300,000 tons of oil would cost approximately $36
million to clean up. Thus, both of the Act's ceilings are deficient. See note 78 supra.
83 E. COWAN, supra note 76, at 225; N.Y. Times, March 28, 1970, at 45, col. 6.
84 N.Y. Times, March 4, 1970, at I, col. 1.
85 There, one of Chevron Oil Company's drilling platforms caught fire on February
10, 1970. Id., March 10, 1970, at 28, coL 1. Until March 10, when the fire was
extinguished, there was little pollution. Ryan, A Gooey Sickness Smears the Gulf, SPORTS
ILLUS=ATn, March 30, 1970, at 53. For the next 20 days the wells spewed between 600
and 1,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf daily. N.Y. Times, March 24, 1970, at 27, col. 1. Efforts
to contain the discharged oil were largely unsuccessful, and only unseasonable winds. kept the
oil away from land. New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 15, 1970, at 1, col. 8;. id.,
March 16, 1970, at 1, col. 8; id., March 17, 1970, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, March 12, 1970.
at 23, col. 1; id., March 13, 1970, at 22, col. 2; id., March 14, 1970, at 30, col. 2 (editorial).
The well was finally capped on March 31. Id., April 1, 1970, at 47, col. 1. The
Gulf spill has already exceeded the Santa Barbara discharge both in terms of amount
of oil discharged and length of time required for cleanup. Remarks of Interior Secretary
Hickel, in New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 15, 1970, at I, col. 8. Thus, it seems
likely that the cost of cleanup will also exceed that incurred at Santa Barbara.
88 See text at notes 98-100 infra.
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IV
COST ALLOCATION CONSIDERATIONS
As between the owner or operator of a tanker or facility and a
private individual, it is clear that the owner or operator should bear
the costs of cleanup. Similar accountability has been imposed under
the theory of enterprise liability when three criteria have been met.
The first is that the activity involved be one in which there is an ab-
normal danger to the community,"7 particularly if the danger is one
that cannot be eliminated; a8 the second is the intentional subjection
by the party engaged in the activity of other persons to the risk in-
volved;s9 the third is the profit motive of the party engaged in the
risk-producing activity.90
Shipping oil always involves the risk of spills,91 and the incidents
in the Santa Barbara channel and the Gulf of Mexico have revealed
how little is known about avoiding accidents during underwater drill-
ing operations. 92 Because the technology for preventing pollution once
a discharge has occurred is inadequate,93 the risk of pollution is one
that cannot be eliminated from the business of the owner or operator
of either a tanker or a facility. That a private individual is subjected
to this risk is due to intentional conduct on the part of the owner
or operator. Moreover, the owner or operator engages in the enterprise
precisely for the purpose of making a profit.94 When all three criteria
are met, the cost of an accident should be a cost of doing business; the
owner or operator is in a much better position to bear and distribute
the risk than is the private individual. Moreover, a situation could
arise in which neither the government nor the owner or operator in-
volved removed the oil from a private individual's property,95 and the
87 W. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 74, at 508 (3d ed. 1964).
88 R ESTATEMENT OF TORTs §§ 519-20 (1938).
89 W. PROSSER, supra note 87, § 74, at 508.
906 Id. at 509.
91 See E. COWAN, supra note 76, at 37.
92 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § I, at 54, col. 2.
93 See text at notes 98-100 infra.
94 In fact, subsidies such as the import quota system, which contribute to the ability
of domestic oil companies to operate, make gasoline and heating oil more expensive for
consumers. Knoll, The Oil Lobby Is Not Depleted, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1970, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 26, 106.
95 The owner or operator might cease his cleanup efforts when he had expended $8 or
$14 million. 'the Act does not make it clear whether the government has a duty to remove
oil from private property; the President is merely authorized to do so.
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individual would be forced to sue the owner or operator.9  Due to
litigation expenses and burden of proof, the private claimant could be
forced to settle for a relatively small amount unless enterprise liability
were imposed on the owner or operator.97
There is another reason for imposing liability on the owner or
operator rather than the private individual: to the extent that it is
possible to prevent discharges, the owner or operator is in a much bet-
ter position to do so than is the private individual. A need for tech-
nological improvement in preventive measures 8 is dictated by the
lack of effective techniques for containment and removal of oil after
discharge.9 9 Because private individuals are in no position to develop
preventive or restorative techniques, impetus for this improvement
must be directed at the owner or operator of the facility or vessel;
motivation will increase as the amount of prospective liability for
cleanup costs rises. 100
The position of the government vis-4-vis the owner or operator
of a facility is different from that of the private individual. In main-
taining import quotas'01 and leasing outer continental shelf lands,102
96 For possible theories of liability, see Sweeney, supra note 78, at 164-206.
97 Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 25-26.
98 Better compartmentalization and improved navigation and regulation of shipping
lanes would reduce the chances of discharges from tankers. Nanda, The Torrey Canyon
Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER LJ. 400, 420-22 (1967). Safety in drilling opera-
tions would be increased by the use of additional casing. 1969 Hearings, pt. 2, at 844-45.
New methods may be developed, such as the use of underwater barges for transporting
oil (M. CAmIN, HYDROSPACE 105-08 (1964); Note, supra note 15, at 116 n.19), and the
transfer of oil from tankers to smaller vessels in order to avoid the necessity of bringing
tankers into harbor.
99 Booms have proved ineffective (E. CowAN, supra note 76, at 187-89; New Orleans
Times-Picayune, March 12, 1970, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, March 18, 1970, at 22, col. 2)
as have suction devices (1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 984; E. CowAN, supra note 76, at 189-40)
and skimmers. 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 984. Detergents, which are perhaps the most ef-
fective dispersal and removal agents, are also the most dangerous to marine life. "[R]e-
search done by scientists after [the Torrey Canyon] disaster . . . showed that spilled oil
killed about 30 percent of the tiny organisms on which fish feed. The detergents used
to remove the oil were even worse, killing 96 percent of those creatures." Water Pollution
-1967, supra note 7, pt. 1, at 10. See also E. COWAN, supra note 76, at 146-56; Ryan, supra
note 85, at 48, 58; Note, supra note 15, at 119. The most effective way to deal with oil
that has reached land may be to spread straw on it as an absorbent and then remove
the straw with pitchforks. New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 18, 1970, at 1, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, March 14, 1970, at 80, col. 2 (editorial).
100 See E. COWAN, supra note 76, at 221-22; Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in
Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 645-55 (1969).
101 Knoll, supra note 94, at 26.
102 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1831-41 (1964).
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the government is an intentional participant in the activity that pro-
duces the risk of pollution. The government also receives substantial
income from both the sales of leases 0 3 and royalty payments. 10 4 During
1968 the total value to the government of rentals, royalties, and bonus
payments from the platforms in the Santa Barbara channel was $1.6
billion.05 Because of this income and its position as sovereign, the
government is more able to bear the costs of cleanup and to spread the
risk involved than is the private individual.
In addition to these enterprise considerations, the government's
powers of inspection and enforcement of regulations pertaining to off-
shore oil operations'0" suggest that it should share liability for cleanup
costs where, as in the recent Gulf of Mexico disaster, violations of
regulations contribute to the discharge 0 7 Just. as owner or operator
liability would provide an impetus to improve preventive and restora-
tive technology, government liability would dictate improvement of
inspection and enforcement measures. 08 Under the 1970 Act as it
stands, however, the government, if liable at all, 09 will only be liable
if cleanup costs exceed $8 million."0 A more sensible provision would
hold the government liable for a certain percentage (based upon its
financial interest in the enterprise) of costs in any spill and for a
103 The leases for the 75 tracts in the Santa Barbara channel were sold for $603,204,-
284. The previous year, 158 tracts in the Gulf of Mexico were sold for $93,125,000. Chan-
nel Sale Swamps Offshore Records, 66 OiL & GAs J., Feb. 12, 1968, at 66; Note, supra
note 15, at 113 n2. For more detailed information on the Santa Barbara oil and gas
lease sale, see 1969 Hearings, pt. 3, at 788-92 (tables).
104 The royalty is fixed by the terms of the lease. For a sample lease see 1969 Hear-
ings, pt. 3, at 735-38.
105 TIME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23; Note, supra note 15, at 113 n.2.
106 E.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1964).
107 Investigations by the United States Geological Survey have revealed that Chev-
ron Oil Company failed to maintain required storm chokes on 137 of its wells in the
Gulf, including well number 6 on platform Charlie which poured oil into the Gulf for
20 days before being capped on March 31, 1970. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1970, at 47, col. 1.
Had the well been equipped with a storm choke, the fire probably would have been
extinguished quickly, and the oil spill would not have occurred. Id., March
26, 1970, at 21, col. 1. The investigations also revealed 210 alleged violations of other
regulations by Chevron. Id. Grand jury indictments have charged Chevron with 900
separate offenses. Id., May 6, 1970, at 1, col. I (city ed.).
108 Present inspection procedures are such that in the seven months following August
1969, officials were able to inspect only 20% of the oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico. Ryan,
supra note 85, at 47. The need for increased manpower and improved procedures is
underscored by Chevron's unwarranted removal of the required storm chokes. N.Y.
Times, March 26, 1970, at 21, col. 1.
109 Note 95 supra.
110 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, §§ ll(0(2)-(3) (April
3, 1970).
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higher percentage where the spill results from its failure to adequately
enforce the applicable regulations..'
Concerning discharges from tankers, on the other hand, the gov-
ernment's position is similar to that of the private individual;112 it is
not involved in intentionally performing an act that subjects the
public to risk or in making an economic profit. Unlike the situation
with regard to facilities, 113 the government derives no direct benefit;
the cost of cleanup resulting from an accident should be imposed upon
neither the private individual nor the government. It must therefore
fall either on the owner or operator, as a cost of doing business, or on
some other party.
V
LABiLrrY oF CARGO OWNERS
During the hearings prior to passage of the 1970 Act, extensive
arguments were made that the proposed liability would be uninsur-
able. Representatives of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping
testified that the maximum insurance obtainable by owners of Amer-
ican vessels for absolute liability would be $67 per gross registered ton
with a ceiling of $5 million. 114 For liability based on negligence, it was
asserted that the limits could not exceed $100 per gross registered ton
or $10 million, whichever was less.115 Representatives of the London
Group of Protection and Indemnity Associations asserted that the
highest liability limits for which insurance could be available would
be $100 per gross registered ton with a ceiling of between $12 and $15
million.1"6
A possible response to such arguments is to decide what the lia-
bility should be, write the law, and worry about the insurance aspect
only if it becomes a problem. 117 This approach recognizes the impos-
sibility of predicting exactly what insurance will be available.118 It is
111 See note 108 supra.
112 Text at notes 87-100 supra.
118 Text at notes 101-10 supra.
114 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1445.
115 Id.
116 Id., pt. 1, at 141. Protection and indemnity insurance covers "liability claims
for personal injury and death, cargo loss or damage, and property damage including oil
pollution." Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 4 (footnote omitted).
117 This suggestion was made by Senator Muskie during the 1969 hearings. 1969
Hearings, pt. 4, at 1327.
118 Id. at 1326-27.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
unlikely that tanker owners and operators would scrap their ships
because they could not be insured; establishment of unlimited lia-
bility, or of liability with very high limits, would probably prompt
these owners and operators to demand a revision of existing insurance
schemes or to create a scheme of self-insurance. Nevertheless, it would
be preferable to impose liability only after a determination that the
party concerned is capable of bearing such liability.
Notwithstanding the fear of absolute liability that is apparently
shared by all the relevant underwriters,"1 9 there appears to be little
reason for the limits on available protection and indemnity insur-
ance. 20 The limits on American vessels are the result of higher con-
struction and maintenance costs, which in turn necessitate higher hull
insurance. 121 Any law that imposes pollution liability on owners of
American vessels and requires a showing of increased financial respon-
sibility will severely handicap American vessels by multiplying already
burdensome insurance needs.122 A possible solution to this problem
would be to eliminate the requirement of a showing of financial re-
sponsibility, thus freeing vessel owners to obtain as much insurance as
they thought necessary. Any claims beyond that amount would have
to be directed at the vessel owner's assets. The effect of such a scheme,
however, would be to re-enact the Limited Liability Act of 1851:123
vessel owners would form one-ship corporations with little or no insur-
ance for each corporation, and the only asset against which claims
could be asserted would be the vessel after the accident.
A solution that would not handicap the American vessel owner
would be to impose liability on the owner of the cargo. 124 In the event
of a discharge the vessel owner or operator would continue to be liable
119 Id. at 1370; Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 25.
120 See Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 25-26.
121 Construction and repair costs in the United States are approximately three
times as high as they are in Japan, for example. Hull insurance premiums are thus also
three times as high for American vessels. 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1340.
122 As a result of high hull insurance, the percentage of operating costs taken by
insurance for American vessels is higher than the comparable percentage for foreign
vessels. It is therefore argued that any increase in required insurance would hurt the
American vessel owner more than the foreign vessel owner, even though the costs of
cleanup insurance would be the same for both. Id.
123 Text at notes 42-46 supra.
124 This was suggested several times during the 1969 hearings. 1969 Hearings, pt. 4,
at 1368; id., App., at 1552.
Where the cargo owner is the owner or operator of the vessel, the effect of this
proposal is to subject the cargo owner to unlimited liability. This does not, however,
invalidate any of the reasons for imposition of liability beyond the limits of the Act
on the cargo owner. See text at notes 127-31 infra.
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for cleanup costs within the Act's limits, but the cargo owner would
be liable for any additional costs. Since the vessel owner or operator
will already have established proof of financial responsibility for $14
million or $100 per gross ton,125 the cargo owner would have only to
establish proof of financial responsibility for cargo not covered by the
vessel owner's or operator's liability. This solution would effectively
secure financial responsibility for the total amount of oil being trans-
ported and would thus reflect actual costs of cleanup more accurately
than do figures based on gross tonnage.126
Imposition of liability on the owner of the cargo is consistent with
the principles of enterprise liability.12 7 The oil companies are inten-
tionally engaged in a risk-creating venture. They profit heavily from
their activity, especially from use of the large tankers that create the
greatest risk,128 and they are in an excellent position to bear and dis-
tribute the risk involved.129 Furthermore, a showing of financial respon-
sibility by the cargo owner in terms of the amount of oil being trans-
ported would preclude a limitation or evasion of liability by one-vessel
or one-cargo corporations. 130 Because of their potential liability for
cleanup costs following negligent discharges, the oil companies would
be given an incentive to select responsible carriers.131
There are two major arguments against cargo-owner liability. The
first is that the major oil companies are a small percentage of those
who are qualified to import oil132 and that the smaller companies could
not cover high or unlimited liability. It would not be necessary, how-
125 Note 57 supra.
126 Using the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration's figures (note 78
supra), the cost of cleaning up one ton of oil can be calculated. Thus, for any given
vessel, the amount of the cargo (in terms of potential cleanup costs) actually covered by
the owner's or operator's liability can be determined. The cargo owner would have to
establish proof of financial responsibility for the potential cleanup costs of the remain-
ing cargo. This showing of responsibility would be calculated in terms of the cargo
carried, not the vessel's tonnage. See note 78 supra.
127 Text at notes 87-97 supra.
128 This is not to say that large tankers are necessarily not as safe as small
ones. See E. Cowman, supra note 76, at 211-12. What is certain is that a large tanker has
the potential for much more extensive pollution than a small tanker.
129 A small oil importer who deals with consumers is in a better position to distrib-
ute the risk from pollution than is a small vessel owner who deals with an oil company.
180 Using the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration's figures (note 78
supra), the exact amount of financial responsibility that would have to be shown is
not clear. However, it should reflect the cost of cleanup, and thus would have to be
between $240 and $300 per ton of oil actually carried.
131 The owner or operator is liable for the full cleanup costs in the event of a
willful discharge. Text at note 54 supra. Thus, cargo-owner liability would be predi-
cated upon bwner or operator negligence.
132 See 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1416.
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ever, for the smaller companies to face this liability alone. The Tank-
ers Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion is evidence that a self-insurance scheme is possible; 133 there are
indications that such a scheme could insure unlimited liability.134 Since
the major companies import the preponderance of oil,' 35 they could
bear the major burden of a self-insurance plan. In addition, because
the cost of transporting a ton of oil decreases as the size of the tanker
increases, 36 insurance premiums could be on a sliding scale, with the
companies that save by the use of larger tankers paying proportionately
more.
The second objection to the proposal arises from the frequent
133 Known as TOVALOP, this scheme provides
that a Participating Tanker Owner will reimburse national governments for
expenses reasonably incurred by them to prevent or clean up pollution of coast
lines as the result of the negligent discharge of oil from one of his tankers. The
tanker causing the discharge is presumed to be negligent unless the owner can
establish that discharge occurred without the tanker's fault. The Participating
Owners would not, under TOVALOP, reimburse prevention or clean-up costs
incurred by private parties. However, if a national government spends monies
to remove oil from privately owned coast lines, it could, in the case of negligence
of the discharging tanker, recover these expenses from the tanker owner.
In the event of a negligent discharge of oil .... the tanker owner involved
is obligated to reimburse the national government concerned for oil removal
costs reasonably incurred by it up to a maximum of $100.00 (U.S.) per gross
registered ton of the tanker discharging the oil, or $10,000,000 (U.S.), whichever
is lesser. If the owner himself also helps remove the oil, his costs in effect
result in prorating the government's claim where the combined costs exceed
these limits.
Id., pt. 1, at 258.
The companies that originally sponsored TOVALOP were British Petroleum Com-
pany Limited, Gulf Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Shell International Petro-
leum Company Limited, Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company
(New Jersey), and Texaco, Inc. Id. at 257.
'34 One self-insurance scheme covering unlimited liability is the proposed Air Trans-
port Insurance, designed to insure potential liability caused by the operation of the new
Boeing 747 jets. Id., pt. 4, at 1323-24, 1332-33. On international flights, liability is limited
to $75,000 per person; on domestic flights, on the other hand, liability is unlimited. Id.
at 1332; Mendelsohn, supra note 75, at 16. Because a 747 can carry up to 490 people,
an accident involving only one such plane could result in more than $100 million of
liability. 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1332. The position of the airlines is similar to that of
the oil companies in that Air Transport Insurance would only insure beyond the limits of
the market. Id. at 1324-25. In addition, although airline liability is not absolute, "vir-
tually the only time that the airlines have a chance of not paying is in the case of a
sabotage accident." Id. at 1329. The similarities between the circumstances of the airlines
and the oil companies suggest that the oil companies could also implement a self-
insurance scheme. Indeed, Clarence Pell, Director of Airline Transport Insurance, S.A.,
indicated that he would rather form such an insurance scheme with oil companies than
with airlines because of the former's more readily available capital. Id. at 1326.
135 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1422 (testimony of Everett S. Checket on behalf of the
American Petroleum Institute). See also id. at 1434-39 (tables).
138 E. CowN, supra note 76, at 13-14.
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changes in ownership of oil during a voyage.137 This could make en-
forcement of compulsory insurance impossible. However, notification
of proposed changes in ownership could be made compulsory, with
buyers required to prove their financial responsibility prior to actual
exchange.138
The 1970 Act's strength is its emphasis on cleanup and prevention
of pollution following a discharge; establishment of cargo owner lia-
bility beyond the limits of owner or operator liability would enhance
this purpose by allowing government cleanup efforts to proceed with-
out regard to cost.
Douglas Meiklejohn
137 Sweeney, supra note 78, at 199-200.
138 Two additional arguments were presented during the Senate hearings, but they
have already been answered. The first was that allocation of liability among oil com-
panies would be impossible for any given cargo. 1969 Hearings, pt. 4, at 1416. Under the
proposal advocated herein, however, the cargo owner whose oil was discharged would be
liable. The second argument was that the legislation covers all vessels, but that oil
companies should not be held liable for spills from passenger vessels. Id. However, the
liability limits provided by the Act are probably sufficient to cover spillages of fuel
from vessels other than tankers. Note 72 supra.
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